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African economic integration and peacekeeping constitute respectively the 
largest institutionalization, and the largest operationalization, of the African 
Union (AU) and its sub-regional organisations. The number of African soldiers 
and police in AU and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has grown 
steadily. Sometimes, major strategic decisions have been mistakes which 
aggravated, or even catalysed conflicts that would not otherwise have occurred. 
The peacekeeping missions in Nigeria and Somalia are examples of these. 
Peacekeeping operations are in the larger scheme of things part of the on-going 
project of African integration. This paper identifies major problems that remain 
persistent after half a century of protracted Pan-Africanist endeavours at sub-
regional and continental integration. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm 
between aspirational treaties voluntarily signed, and their implementation, 
taking at best a decade or decades.  Often, entities founded on paper remain 
dormant, until in a subsequent decade another structure is founded to 
operationalize the function of the previous paper entity, with this process going 
through several iterations.  
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The number of African soldiers and police in AU and UN peacekeeping 
operations has grown steadily to 75 000 personnel, while the founding of 
the African Standby Force has been repeatedly postponed since 2010. 
Sometimes, major strategic decisions have been mistakes which 
aggravated, or even catalysed conflicts that would not otherwise have 
occurred. Peacekeeping operations are in the larger scheme of things part 
of the on-going project of African integration.  
The current AU slogan is “a continent that is peaceful, prosperous, 
and integrated” in contrast to some current war-torn, impoverished, and 
fragmented realities. This paper identifies major protracted problems that 
persist after half a century of Pan-Africanist endeavours at sub-regional 
and continental integration. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm 
between aspirational treaties voluntarily signed, and their implementation, 
taking at best a decade. Often, entities founded on paper remain 
dormant, until in a subsequent decade another structure is founded to 
operationalize the function of the previous paper entity, with this process 
going through several iterations. Peacekeeping is a classical instance of 
this. The efforts at evolving economic integration, from free trade areas 
through to customs unions and common markets, and attempted 
monetary unions, provide another area of case studies. 
 
2.  Persistent Peace-Keeping and Political Problems 
 
2.1. The standard, time-honoured practices of international peacekeeping 
include that troops should not be drawn from any state that has 
contiguous borders with, or is the former colonialist power of, the 
country where the peacekeeping forces are deployed. In Somalia, the 
violation of this principle had devastating consequences: al-Shabaab, 
initially only a few hundred persons, mobilized many thousands of 
insurgents through nationalist appeals to Somali patriots to resist the 
Ethiopian “invaders”. (Agbiboa, 2015:189)  Had the AU drawn upon 
peacekeepers from ECOWAS countries, for example, al-Shabaab would 
have been unable to succeed in such mobilization. While al-Shabaab has a 
religious dimension, it would have recruited far fewer insurgents had 
Ethiopian forces not been involved. 
In the Central African Republic, the use of Chadian troops as 
peacekeepers led to pogroms against the Chad diaspora and the Muslim 
minority. (Cape Times, 24 December 2013). Had peacekeeping operations 




drawn upon EAC countries’ armies for example, such a backlash would 
have been avoided. 
Had deployments of peacekeepers not been drawn from neighbouring 
states, this would have made it difficult to observe the principle of 
subsidiarity between the AU and the relevant regional economic 
community. However, the 2008 MOU between the AU and RECs on 
peacekeeping does permit choice between “subsidiarity, complementarity, 
and comparative advantage” (section 16(1)(b) 
 
2.2. One major problem is lawless behaviour by state forces. Kenyan 
police and military summarily executed al-Shabab suspects. (Abwao, 
2016) In Nigeria, the lawless terror of the Nigerian police, army, and 
militias, including extra-judicial killings, alienated many citizens whose 
cooperation against Boko Haram1 is essential to its defeat. (Solomon, 
2015: 225; Matfess, 2017; Taub, 2017)  One Nigerian army massacre 
alone killed 347 Shia Muslim followers of Zakzakry, whose corpses were 
dumped in a mass grave. (Aljazeera 2016/08) The same applies to the 
Malian army.  Malian army abuses during counter-terrorism operations 
include arbitrary arrests, torture, and scores of extra-judicial executions. 
(Dufka, 2017). One UN research monograph reports that the trigger 
event which caused 71% of insurgents to join a violent extremist 
organization in Africa was state security forces’ arrest or killing of a 
friend or family member. (Ojielo et al, 2017: 5, 80, 83) 
 
2.3. Many African heads of government do not consider it in their national 
interest to implement the treaties they voluntarily signed: 
 
. “…it is important to understand African Regional Trade Agreements on 
their own terms, because they have contextualizing imperatives grounded 
in African history, politics and realities […..] It is a truism that the legal 
obligations assumed under these treaties are not understood by the 
leaders as containing punitive sanctions for non-compliance….. not 
willing.. to completely surrender certain competencies to the 
supranational organizations created by these treaties. ” ( Gathii, 2011: 
xxvii) (emphasis added) 
 
                                                            
1 “Boko Haram” is one of its slogans; its actual name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda'awati wal-Jihad. 
 




 “It can take several years for a decision or reform to be actually 
implemented.... Goverments are jealous of their sovereignty, and many 
have an unstated interest in a weak AU... One fundamental problem ... 
is the incapacity of the AU to enforce its rules and decisions as well as 
the cynicism with which many member states regard these rules and 
decisions.“ (Mohammed, 2008: 62, 63) 
 
One reason for failure to implement decisions is that the  heads of 
government vote for AU documents that they, and their ministers, have 
no time to read. (Tieku, 2016: 8, 14, 34-37)  
One example is the Yamoussoukro Declaration of 1999 that all African 
countries should offer open skies to each other’s airlines, has not been 
implemented nineteen years later. The 2018 treaty for a Single African 
Air Transport Market is basically an unimplemented re-iteration of the 
unimplemented 1999 Declaration. The EU has in the meantime 
advanced from open skies to a seamless sky. According to IATA, by just 
deregulating and liberating African air services in 12 key markets, an extra 
155,000 jobs and $1.3 billion could be generated. (Lopes, 2016) 
Operationally, the AU is an inter-governmental organisation; in fact it 
prefers consensus decisions, or taking no action, rather than to force 
voting to a two-thirds majority to which it is entitled. But de jure, its 
mandates and signed treaties and protocols confer supra-national 
authority onto at least five sub-regional courts and three continental 
judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. 
Most spectacularly of all, the Constitutive Act, article 4(h): the right to 
intervene in genocide, crimes against humanity, and other grave 
circumstances (a statutory world first), implies or requires a post-
Westphalian epoch. This is also required by the ultimate sixth phase of 
the AEC Treaty, and the AU Non-Aggression & Common Defence Pact: 
continental governance with a parliament, a common market, an apex 
court, a single currency, and “an African army”. Whenever a state has 
submitted to an adverse ruling from the African, ECOWAS, or East 
African Courts of Justice, we start to have, de jure and de facto, a 
polycentric sovereignty.  
That is, whenever a national sovereign executive submits to the authority 
of a court based in another country. 
Authoritarian regimes naturally defy such adverse judgements or ceding 
sovereign prerogatives. The proposed Combined Exclusive Maritime 
Zone of Africa (CEMZA) will imply what Dr. Dlamini-Zuma 
diplomatically called “the collective exercise of sovereignty” (Business 
Day, 28 October 2013). She has also used the phrase “the pooling of 




sovereignty”. This would go beyond the current EU to start to acquire 
the characteristics of a confederation.  Needless to say, nominal target 
dates for such supra-national endeavors, like a mirage, keep inevitably 
retreating ever-further into the future: 2032, 2050, and 2063. In a 
nutshell, no head of government who signed any of these treaties will still 
be in office, nor even alive, to take the blame when deadlines for delivery 
are not met, but will realistically again require further postponements. 
 
2.4. Pan-Africanism, even more than Pan-Europeanism and the 
European Union (EU), lacks popular support, and is confined to a tiny 
middle class elite of some amongst  intellectuals, politicians, and 
bureaucrats. Rare exceptions include post-Nkrumah Ghanaian popular 
pride in Pan-Africanism, and post-genocide Rwandan popular support 
for mechanisms of international governance. In South Africa, 
xenophobic pogroms against foreign Africans have led to members of the 
Nigerian public retaliating, and diplomatic protests. (Bateman: 2017)  To 
deepen the AU from a union of presidents to a union of peoples will, at 
the very least, require direct elections to the Pan-African Parliament. It 
will also require a high public profile for the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and to found some popularizing civil 
society organizations, such as Friends of the AU, or a non-party partisan 
Pan-African Association. 
 
2.5. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm between aspirational treaties 
voluntarily signed, and their implementation, taking at best a decade or 
decades.  Often, entities founded on paper remain dormant, until in a 
subsequent decade another structure is founded to operationalize the 
function of the previous paper entity, with this process going through 
several iterations. An extreme example of this is the African peace and 
security architecture. (See Table 1). 
 
 
3. Persistent Budgetary and Economic Problems 
 
3.1 African governments, decade after decade, lack the political 
commitment to pay the bills. At the most basic level, the failure of most 
states to pay annual membership fees throughout the thirty-nine years of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the first four of the AU 
paralysed them from doing little beyond photocopying resolutions, 
unless they found foreign donors. The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) also functions overwhelmingly on Nigeria 
paying for all fifteen members. (eg., Adebajo, 2008: 144)  Some individual 




AU members were in turn dependent on a foreign donor. South African 
former president Mbeki queried if a country may be called sovereign, if 
half of its budget comes from its former colonial power. (Mbeki, 2012) 
Half of the AU budget, and over nine-tenths of its peacekeeping budget, 
and 61% of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
budget, comes from foreign donors - overwhelmingly NATO donors. 
(Mataboge: 2015; https://www.enca.com/africa/sadc-look-ways-cut-
down-reliance-donor-funding) The Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) also has donor dependency. (http://www.c
omesa.int/?s=Comesa+Adjustment+Facility) After 2005, the AU’s big 
five by GDP – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa – agreed to 
collectively pay 75% of the African half of the AU budget in addition to 
their own annual membership fees, with the fifty other countries only 
paying one-quarter between them: that is, one-eighth of the total AU 
budget. There are other states with an oil windfall, such as Angola, and 
Equatorial Guinea, who could also contribute far more to the AU 
budget.  
In 2007, nine states were up to date with their membership fees, 
twenty-five states were in arrears for the current year, and twenty-one 
states were in arrears for more than one year. Of the five states that had 
agreed to come to the rescue by paying in an additional 75% of the AU 
budget, only Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa had paid up, with Egypt 
and Libya behind schedule. (AU Audit, 2008:29) The latest proposal is 
that all states will pay 0.2% of the value of their imports to the AU. 
(Business Day 18 July 2016) Analysts wait to see if the funds actually paid 
over will be higher than in the past. 
One extreme example of donor dependency is the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which depends on foreign 
donors for one-third of its budget, even depending on a Danish institute 
to write its documents: 
 
“a strategic plan is the operational plan of the Mandate of an  
Organization and cannot be outsourced to a foreign interest” (AU 
Audit, 2008: 85).  
 
A critic of the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) 
and the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) argues that they are 
“African in name only: they have no monetary policies of their own, nor do 
they even know how much of the 85% of their forex held by the French 
Treasury belongs to them“. (cited in Gathii, 2011: 360).  
 




3.2. The potential benefits of merging free trade areas, and upgrading 
transport infrastructure, are in too many cases negated by corruption at 
borders and along the highways. The problem of extortion by police or 
militia serial roadblocks, each acting like feudal toll barons on the Rhine 
and Danube rivers, occurs in country after country.  
Roadblocks by rival Kenyan police forces on the Lake Victoria to 
Mombasa road extort the equivalent of $100 from lorry drivers. (African 
Independent, 12 January 2016) Between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, 
the Abidjan-Yamoussoukro road has five roadblocks demanding bribes. 
(The Economist, Special Report. Business in Africa.  16 April 2016.) One 
freight company in Boksburg, South Africa, has to issue each lorry driver 
with the equivalent of $200 in US banknotes to pass roadblocks in the 
DRC. (Sunday Times Business Times, 3 October 2010.) The Zimbabwe 
police also harass drivers for bribes. (http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opin
ion/reflections-on-corruption-in-zimbabwe 28 November 2016) and 
officials demand at least $6.(Manayiti: 2016). The cumulative consequenc
es of such corruption, as medieval tolls, are to limit long-distance trade to 
only high value items. 
 
3.3. One failure with escalating consequences is the failure to provide 
compensation mechanisms for least developed economies entering free 
trade areas, customs unions, or a common market: “given the absence of 
distributional mechanisms, laissez-faire market integration increased 
internal disequilibria” (Zajontz & Leyssens, 2015: 306) On its own, free 
trade creates loser regions as well as winners. 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
Protocol on the Fund for Compensation for Loss of Revenue has not yet 
been implemented. The ECOWAS treaty 1975 Article 50 (1993 revision: 
Article 21), specified an ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, 
Compensation, and Development - which no member state would fund, 
1979-19992. Instead, as next-best, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID) was set up: but a bank cannot make 
substantive grants, only loans.  
The African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty of 1991, article 80, 
also requires founding and capitalizing a Solidarity, Development, and 
Compensation Fund. A quarter of a century later, there is no trace of it. 
The COMESA Adjustment Facility is the only such fund that is 
                                                            
2 Article 39 also specifies remedies for trade deflection due to lowering of import duties. 
The original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty Article 25 empowered the Council of Ministers to 
determine compensation. 




operational and is partly donor dependent. (http://www.comesa.int/?s=
Comesa+Adjustment+Facility) Even in the third largest economy on the 
continent, South Africa, the SA Paint Manufacturing Association 
(SAPMA) has complained that the Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) 
agreement leaves them disadvantaged by the future imports of Egyptian 
paint with export subsidies. ( Cokayne, 2017). 
 As the FTAs and Customs Unions which exist on paper become 
actually implemented, the need for such compensatory mechanisms for 
the least developed countries becomes more urgent. Currently, only the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has South Africa paying de 
facto annual compensation to Lesotho and Swaziland for lowering 
customs duties upon which they depend for government revenue. In the 
continental context, the oil-windfall states could capitalize such a fund. 
Other states such as South Africa could offer asymmetric and variable 
geometry terms: soft borders for migrant workers; lower fees for 
remittances; grants for trans-border transport and energy infrastructure, 
are amongst feasible modes of compensation. In the specific case of 
South Africa, compensation could also take the mode of providing 
pensions  and medical aid, especially for respiratory diseases and STDs, 
to former migrant mine workers who after retirement, retrenchment, or 
medical boarding out, have returned to their homes in Lesotho or 
southern Mozambique. The signing of the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA) protocol makes the case for compensatory 
mechanisms to regions and states that lose out, more important. Since an 
AfCFTA is envisioned in both the African Economic Community treaty 
of 1991, and in the AU Minimum Integration Programme, as merely a 
stage towards a continental customs union, delay in addressing this point 
risks a rising backlash, as is already occurring amongst some voters of 
countries within the European Union. 
 
4. Persistent Administrative and Institutional Problems 
 
4.1. One rarely-stated problem is the lack of quantitative and qualitative  
capacity of continental and regional secretariats. The EU has 23 000 
Eurocrats to service twenty-seven countries totalling five hundred 
million people. By that standard, the AU Commission, servicing fifty-
four countries with one billion citizens, requires 46 000 Afrocrats: it 
currently has 1 474 posts filled. (Tieku, 2016:31) Even adding on the 
combined posts of the secretariats of the sub-regional economic 
communities, plus those of the supra-national courts, the total number of 
full-time Afrocrats is around 2 300. To service crucial and interminable 




negotiations with the EU and WTO, both the AUC and the regional 
community secretariats need, above all, 4 key categories of professionals 
– employment of econometrists, economists, statisticians, and trade 
lawyers. The SADC secretariat, for example, has posts for only two trade 
lawyers. The urgency of creating such professional posts is that most 
important economic decisions affecting Africa are still taken outside 
Africa. Most of the AU diplomatic missions in Brussels, Geneva, New 
York, and Washington do not have the technically qualified professionals 
needed to give input to very complex negotiations affecting AU states. 
(AU Audit, 2008: 63) 
 
4.2. The “strictly confidential” Adu Report of 1972 spelt out other major 
failures of management with the OAU secretariat. An international 
organization must have staff demonstrating loyalty to it alone. But the 
OAU had instances of some staff members lobbying their own country’s 
ambassador or head of state for support against their employer or 
manager. (Wolfers, 1976: 89) By the 1970s, managerial authority had 
declined. The secretariat had “poor control" over such basics as stores 
and handling post. The Secretariat was unable to discipline staff for 
unpunctuality and absenteeism. (Wolfers, 1976: 88-89) Such problems 
persisted three decades later. The 2008 AU Audit Report found the AUC 
is characterized by “internal institutional incoherence and disarray with a 
dysfunctional working and managerial culture at all levels“. It 
recommended that only the AUC Chair and Deputy Chair should be 
elected by the heads of state, but all other officers selected solely on 
merit. (Handy, 2012:16) The Chair of the African Union complained in 
2007 of:  
 
“inadequacy of financial resources, limited and ambiguous mandates and 
incongruity of portfolio content and inadequate human resources“. 
(Adejumobi & Olukoshi, 2008: 12-13)   
 
The AU Audit flagged organisational and managerial issues from top to 
bottom. The AUC Chair, Deputy Chair and Commissioners‘ relationship 
“can best be described as dysfunctional“ (Audit, 2008:44), a problem that 
continues until today.  The eight commissioners who were appointed to 
office in September 2003 did not meet until September 2005. After that, 
in contrast to most states having weekly cabinet meetings, they averaged 
only one meeting per three weeks where substantive issues were “hardly 
ever discussed“. The Chair and Deputy “hardly attended“, and on 
average five out of ten Commissioners failed to attend each meeting as 




they preferred to travel. This is due to over-generous per diem allowances 
raising their gross remuneration if they travel excessively. Minutes of 
these meetings were untranslated from their original language, and not 
circulated for over a year. (ibid:48) There was no consistent attempt to 
bring directors together who consequently had a silo approach. (ibid:49) 
Five out of thirteen directors appointed in 2001 had resigned by 2004: 
 
“a failure to accept or articulate a chain of command ...poor to non-
existent internal communication strategies and ineffective accountabilit
y mechanisms are central to the disempowerment and demoralization 
among staff“ (ibid: 47)  
 
There was no initial induction of staff, no performance-based system; 
staff trying to claim benefits and payment were blocked when the 
Administrative Tribunal was not convened for four years. Quality staff 
left for better remuneration at other inter-governmental organizations. 
(ibid:52) Some members of the Permanent Representives Council 
pressured the AUC to hire their relatives or fellow-citizens, or applied 
themselves, and when rejected, this increased tensions. (ibid: 59) An 
analyst notes                                                                                        
 
“A number of unhelpful and bureaucratic practices developed and 
became entrenched in the OAU, which hindered the professionalism 
and effectiveness of the organization – these practices create obstacles 
for the AU.“ (Mohammed, 2008: 61)  
 
The AU is also hurt by the same difficulties as the UNO: 
 
“The AU is understaffed and, like many such bureaucracies, suffers 
from a surfeit of the incompetent, lazy, or indifferent. As with many 
multilateral organizations, sacking the corrupt or inefficient is 
extraordinarily difficult and runs into political objections from 
member states [...] Stronger mechanisms for accountability are 
needed that allow for the investigation and removal of senior officers 
if they are guilty of malfeasance or other misdemeanors.“  
(Mohammed, 2008: 64, 72) 
 
The same capacity problems are as true of the regional economic 
communities, for example: “there is inadequate capacity in the ECOWAS 
Commission to embark on this range of [peacekeeping] activities... there 
is still a dire shortage of such expertise ... the Commission is grossly 
understaffed to undertake many of the related responsibilities” 
(Olonisakin, 2008: 359) 





4.3. Some OAU subsidiary organisations appear to have become defunct.  
Desktop search turns up no website for them, but only the original OAU 
treaty, plus numbers of on-line databases listing their name, but without 
any reports of any activities. Examples of this include the African 
Accounting Council, founded 1979 in Kinshasa as a specialized agency of 
the OAU. (SA DIRCO, 2012) Another is the African Rehabilitation 
Institute, set up in 1991 in Harare. As this article goes to  print in 2019, 
even the search engine of the AU website reveals no trace of them. On-
line search for the Association of African Trade Promotion 
Organizations (headquartered in Tangier), the Oganization of African 
Trade Union Unity (Accra), and the African Timber Organization 
(Libreville), yield no websites for them, but only a very few third-party 
references to their activities within the past decade. The AU gives no 
activities of UMA later than 1989 (http://www.au.int/en/recs/uma) and 
the UMA website itself mentions an average of only one event per year. 
The most recent successful achievement, back in 2010, appears to be as 
non-political as possible: a conference of national institutes of 
meterology to help cooperation in weather forecasts. (http://www.maghr
ebarabe.org/en/news.cfm?type=2&id=289)The African Petroleum Fund 
was on paper founded in 2010 – not one African state would contribute 
towards it - so it still does not exist. (Ghana Business News: 2012) 
 
4.4. One scarcely discussed problem is the duplication of expensive 
institutions and structures, which also require expensive and scarce high-
level personnel. In terms of the phases of the African Economic 
Community and other treaties, protocols, and policies, the sub-regional 
communities should be merged into continental institutions. This implies 
merging the secretariats into the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, but 
one may anticipate bureaucratic inertia or resistance. It might be argued 
that since the AU services a continent around four times the size of the 
EU, this would merit regional AU offices. But even in that case the 
SADC and COMESA secretariats in Gaberone and nearby Lusaka 
respectively would still need to be rationalized, as would the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) headquarters in 
Djibouti, close to the AU HQ in Addis Ababa. Another example is the 
proposed African Investment Bank, for which a Technical Steering 
Committee is already set up in Tripoli. This would appear to have its 
functions duplicated by the already existing African Development Bank 
(Abidjan), the Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’investissement et le 




Commerce/ Sahel-Sahara Bank for Investment and Trade (Tripoli), the 
African Export - Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK, Cairo) and over a 
dozen other sub-regional financial Quangos listed in Table 2. It will be a 
tough challenge to amalgamate them, or at the least reconstitute them as 





Problems in African peace-keeping include peacekeeping soldiers drawn 
from a neighbouring state to where they are deployed, and widespread 
lawless actions during counter-terrorism operations. Problems in African 
integration include protracted delays in, or non-ratification of treaties. 
Also, Pan-Africanism is too often confined to a small elite of 
intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats. Persistent budgetary problems 
stem from widespread failure to pay annual dues. Corrupt roadblocks 
exact extortion on many routes. Administrative problems in continental 
and sub-regional organizations include protracted managerial failures, a 
lack of technical capacity, and far smaller number of posts in contrast to 
EU norms. 
Notwithstanding the above, we can unequivocally affirm that the AU 
and sub-regional family of organisations’ achievements have cumulatively 
surpassed its contemporaries such as the Arab League, Organization of 
American States, Union of South American Nations, and the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations. Only the EU has achieved more, and it has 
a budget three orders of magnitude higher than the AU. AU and sub-
regional community peacekeeping is on a scale other regional 
communities do not even contemplate. The founding of free trade areas, 
customs unions, and monetary unions is ahead of most other southern 
states. The EU was founded by six states, and the other regional 
communities were founded by typically a dozen. To negotiate the lowest 
common denominator of interests between fifty-five sovereign states is 
phenomenally difficult: no entity but the UNO has even attempted this. 
But further progress towards deepening African integration will depend 
















   
The long walk to an African Peace and Security Architecture 
 
1958: Nkrumah proposes an African Legion and African High Command. 
1963:  OAU Charter articles VII and XIX propose a Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration; never set up. 
OAU Defence Commission, 1st meeting, Accra. 
 OAU founds Liberation Committee, with Defence Committee, Dar es Salaam. 
1965: OAU Defence Commission, 2nd meeting, Freetown. 
1970: OAU Defence Commission, 3rd and 4th  meetings, Addis Ababa, Lagos. 
1971: OAU Defence Commission, 5th meeting, Addis Ababa. 
1979: OAU Defence Commission, 6th meeting, Addis Ababa. 
1981: OAU 1st military peacekeeping, Chad, December 1981-June 1982. 
1990: ECOMOG peacemaking in Liberia. 
1991: OAU NMOG in Rwanda, 55 observers. 
1993: OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution  
founded. 
1994-95:OAU OMIB in Burundi, 52 observers. 
1995: OAU Peace Fund established: decision to set up peacekeeping brigades 
in each of five regions. 
1996: OAU 1st African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) meeting. 
1997: OAU 2nd Chiefs of Staff meeting, Harare. 
1998: SADC peacemaking in Lesotho. 
          ECOMOG peacemaking in Sierra Leone, almost 15 000 at peak. 
          ECOMOG peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau. 
          OAU sets up Situation Room in its Conflict Management Centre. 
          OAU OMIC in Comoros, 29 observers. 
2002: Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of  the African Union signed.          
2003: OAU-AU 3rd Chiefs of Staff meeting. 
          AU 3 000 peace-keepers in Burundi. 
          AU starts peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan. 
2004: 4th Chiefs of Staff meeting. 
          1st meeting of African Ministers of Defence. 
          PSC & EU Peace Facility [ie. Fund] founded. 
          Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) 
founded. 
          African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism founded. 
           Common African Defence and Security Policy adopted. 




2005: Algerian, Egyptian, Libyan, Mauritanian, SADR, and Tunisian Chiefs of    
Defence. Staff meeting in Tripoli: MOU for North African Regional 
Capability signed. 
          AU Non-Aggression  and Common Defence Pact signed:  
             Article 4(d) “As part of the vision of building a strong and united   
Africa, State Parties  undertake to establish an African Army at the 
final stage of the political and economic integration of the continent.” 
2007:    Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) set up. 
             Panel of the Wise set up. 
             Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace   
and Security between the AU, the RECs and the Coordinating 
Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and 
Northern Africa. 
            AMISOM peacemakers arrive in Somalia; slow build-up to 17 000. 
2008:    5th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting. 
2009:     6th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting. 
2010:     ASF Military Staff Committee founded; advisory only.  
              ECOWAS sets up Observation & Monitoring System, HQ Abuja. 
             SADC sets up Early Warning System HQ, Gaberone.  
             IGAD sets up Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, HQ   
Addis  Ababa. 
            CEMOC founded (Algeria, Mauretania, Mali, Niger. HQ: Tamanrasset) 
       Launch of African Standby Force postponed. 
2011:      7th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting. 
2012:      ECOWAS and Chad forces in Mali. 
              ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau. 
              Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and Regional Intelligence 
Fusion Unit (RIFU).  Founded 1998, has in 2012 its mandate 
broadened to anti-terrorism. (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria 
(ie Lake Chad Basin  Commission and Benin. first HQ: Baga) 
              (From now on, operational strength of AU military in AU and UN-AU  
hybrid Missions, plus other multilateral forces, exceeds the 25 000    
military and police personnel proposed for the ASF launch in 2010.) 
2013:      AFISMA in Mali. AU and SADC contingents in UN force in DRC. 
              MICOPAX and FOMAC forces; then AFISM-CAR in Central African  
Republic. 
2014:  MISCA force in CAR rises to 6 000.  MJFT relocates HQ to        
N’djamena, reinforced to 8 700 soldiers and police. 
              Adoption of African Integrated Maritime Strategic Plan for 2050, including 
a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA). 
              African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity operational, 5 000 personnel 
strength. 
2015:   Association of African Air Forces (AAAF) founded; now up to 23     
member nations. 




2016:      AU Mission in South Sudan. 
2018:      8th annual symposium of African Air Force chiefs, Marrakech. 
20XX?: latest postponed date for formal launch of African Standby    
Force two decades after continuous deployment of ad hoc ECOWAS, 
SADC, AU, military and police peacekeeping forces. 
 
Table 2: Before the African Investment Bank is founded: 
 
Pre- Existing Financial Quangos 
African Development Bank (AfDB) Tunis 
African Export - Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK) Cairo 
African Institute for Remittances (AIR) Nairobi 
African Risk Capacity Agency (ARC), Johannesburg 
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) Pretoria/Tshwane 
African Trade Insurance Agency, Nairobi 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), Khartoum 
Association of African Central Banks (AACB / ABCA) Dakar 
Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAI), Dakar 
Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), Yaoundé 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l’investissement et le Commerce (BSIC), 
Tripoli/ Sahel-Sahara Bank for Investment & Trade 
COMESA Infrastructure Fund, Port Louis 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Pretoria/Tshwane1 
East African Development Bank, Kampala2 
ECOWAS Bank for Investment & Development (EBID), Lomé 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC), Pretoria/Tshwane1 
NEPAD Planning & Coordinating Agency (NPCA), Midrand 
L'Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA) / Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, 
Dakar3 
 Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), Johannesburg 
[COMESA]  Trade and Development Bank, Bujumbura 
[COMESA] Regional Investment Agency, Cairo  




1. The DBSA & IDC, notwithstanding the “South African” remaining in their 
names, have had their statutory mandates expanded to be continental. 
2. Note also the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Monetary 
Union, 2013: the track record of the EAC to date indicates that their 
intentions may be taken seriously. 
3. Technically OHADA is juridical & legal in nature, but is included here as its 
work is to facilitate intra-African business, commerce, & finance 
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